What the Geopolitical Storm Around Greenland Reveals About Great-Power Rivalry in the Arctic and International Law

I. Great Power Dynamics in the Arctic: Greenland in the Crosshairs 

Greenland (Kalaallit Nunaat) has become part of a renewed geopolitical contestation, spurred by the United States (U.S.) rhetoric and the resulting diplomatic friction across the Atlantic. The vast land belongs to the people of Greenland who govern the territory through the self-government arrangement with the Kingdom of Denmark. The relationship between Copenhagen and Nuuk had been shaped and complicated by centuries of Danish colonial rule, which officially ceased in 1953 when Greenland’s colonial status ended and it was incorporated into the Danish realm as an ‘equal partner’. Nevertheless, the post-colonial legacy continues to shape relations between the two capitals.

Greenland’s geographical location and its rich deposits of rare earth materials reveal its geopolitical significance for major powers. During the Cold War, the U.S. maintained a substantial military presence in Greenland, which served as a strategic outpost to detecting and intercepting Soviet missiles. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Arctic became a low-tension area marked by cooperation of Arctic states to combat climate change and develop a sustainable Arctic. The U.S. forces largely withdrew, leaving only one U.S. military base – Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) – which is still in operation.

The recent resurgence of American interest in Greenland is not new. The U.S. has unsuccessfully sought to acquire Greenland on at least three occasions: in 1867 following the purchase of Alaska; in 1946, when President Harry Truman offered Denmark USD 100 million in gold; and again in 2019, when President Donald Trump publicly floated the idea during his first term in office. Although President Trump’s initial interest in Greenland was widely dismissed, the seriousness of Trump’s intentions became clear when he returned to the Oval Office again in 2025. He openly threatened that the U.S. might take Greenland from Denmark  – by military force if necessary  – justifying this move as vital to America’s national interests on the basis of unsubstantiated claims of ‘Russian and Chinese ships all over the place’. The tensions, however, were somewhat alleviated when President Trump announced in Davos that he would not use military force to take Greenland, while still remaining steadfast in his speech that Greenland – what he called a ‘beautiful piece of ice’ – was needed by the United States for ‘strategic national security and international security’.

Russia and China have indeed revived their interest and boosted their presence in the Arctic. Yet there is no credible evidence of a Russian or Chinese military buildup near Greenland. Russia’s military activities remain concentrated around its own Arctic bases. China, having declared itself a ‘near-Arctic state’, has primarily pursued scientific and economic objectives in the region, exploring new trade routes made possible by climate change and melting ice. What has raised concern, however, is China’s participation in joint military exercises with Russia. Although these drills have taken place in other parts of the Arctic far from Greenland, they signalled a shift in the region’s security dynamics. China’s entry into the Arctic through its cooperation with Russia has amplified growing concerns over the militarisation of the Arctic. Responding to mounting security threats posed by Russia and China, NATO has committed to strengthening its military presence in the Arctic alongside Denmark.

As part of the Danish realm, Greenland falls under NATO’s security umbrella and plays a strategic role in NATO’s Arctic and North Atlantic defence architecture. The military takeover of Greenland by the U.S. ‘would spell the end of NATO’, as succinctly put forward by Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen. The U.S. withdrawal from NATO or, even worse, the collapse of the organisation would undoubtedly have catastrophic consequences for collective security in the region. Russia would benefit particularly from the unravelling of NATO, whose expansion it has long invoked to justify its war against Ukraine.

Great power rivalry in the Arctic exacerbated by the crisis surrounding Greenland reveals some notable trends. First, great powers increasingly treat the world as a pie that should be cut based on their spheres of influence, showing a growing readiness to sideline international law and compromise long-standing alliances. Second, as a result of the increased military engagement of great powers in the Arctic, the existing Arctic governance framework might no longer be sustainable. The militarisation of the Arctic is reshaping the region’s security paradigm, with profound long-term consequences for climate change and the livelihoods of Arctic Indigenous Peoples.

II. From ‘Power of the Law’ to the ‘Law of the Powerful’: Whither International Law?

Danish and Greenlandic politicians have consistently emphasised that ‘Greenland is not for sale’ and that all matters concerning Greenland need to be decided by Denmark and Greenland alone. What runs like a red thread through the statements is the reference to the principle of sovereignty and the right of the Greenlandic people to self-determination under international law.

The principle of sovereignty is a foundation of international law consecrated in the UN Charter. Danish presence in Greenland is commonly traced to 1721, when the Danish-Norwegian missionary Hans Egede arrived and symbolically raised a flag, marking the beginning of Danish colonial rule over the island. Two centuries later, in 1933, the question of Danish sovereignty over Greenland was litigated before the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the dispute concerning the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, arising from competing sovereignty claims by Denmark and Norway. In its ruling, the PCIJ held that the Norwegian occupation of eastern Greenland was illegal because Denmark had ‘exercised her sovereign rights to an extent sufficient to constitute a valid title to sovereignty’ (para 168).

During World War II, Denmark temporarily lost effective control over Greenland when Nazi Germany occupied Denmark in April 1940. To prevent Nazi German’s control over the island, Danish Minister in Washington, Henrik Kauffmann, signed an agreement with the United States authorising the establishment of U.S. military bases as a guarantee for Greenland’s defence. This arrangement, however, was a temporary wartime measure and did not entail any transfer of sovereignty over Greenland from Denmark to the United States. In 1951, the Danish government concluded an agreement with the U.S.  – still in force today – which provides the legal basis for a continued and significant U.S. military presence in Greenland. By signing the agreement, the United States expressly recognised Greenland’s status as ‘an equal part of the Kingdom of Denmark’, governed through the ‘Home Rule’ arrangement (later replaced by ‘Self-Government’). Yet, President Trump appears to doubt Danish ‘right of ownership’, claiming that, in the absence of any ‘written documents’, the arrival of a Danish boat ‘hundreds of years ago’ did not entitle Denmark to claim sovereignty rights over Greenland. Such statements run contrary to the established position of the United States that consistently confirmed Greenland’s legal status as an equal partner within the Danish realm, including through its support of the UN General Assembly Resolution in 1954.

As the drama over Greenland unfolded, President Trump also denounced the United Kingdom’s decision to complete the transfer of the Chagos archipelago – home to the U.S.-UK joint military base on Diego Garcia – to Mauritius. The transfer is in line with the UK’s obligations under international law to lawfully complete its decolonisation of Mauritius, as affirmed by the ICJ in its Chagos Advisory Opinion (para. 183). Although the UK has negotiated a long-term lease with Mauritius to retain its military presence on Diego Garcia, the agreement explicitly prevents the return of the Chagossian people (Art. 6) and is widely seen as undermining their right to self-determination (2025 CERD decision). President Trump’s effective denunciation of the ICJ’s ruling in the Chagos OA reflects an earlier worldview in which a greater power was entitled to retain sovereignty over a former colony or conquer a strategically important territory when doing so served its military and geopolitical interests.

Apart from the sovereignty question, it is important to bear in mind that Greenland is not an asset that could be traded or occupied. It is a land inhabited by the people of Greenland who are entitled to exercise the right to self-determination. The Self-Government Act recognises that the people of Greenland constitute a people who enjoy the right to self-determination under international law. The Act further provides that a decision regarding Greenland’s independence shall be taken by the people of Greenland, followed by the conclusion of an agreement between the governments of Denmark and Greenland (Naalakkersuisut), subject to the consent given by the Parliament of Greenland (Inatsisartut) and Parliament in Denmark (Folketing), and subsequently endorsed by a referendum in Greenland (para 21). Against this background, the U.S. rhetoric concerning a potential ‘takeover’ or ‘purchase’ of Greenland interferes with the right of the Greenlandic people to self-determination, as only they are entitled to decide on their future – whether by pursuing full independence from Denmark through a negotiated settlement under Danish constitutional law, by exploring the more legally contested option of unilateral secession under international law, or by pursuing a Free Association agreement as a model of independence. The people of Greenland have expressed their aspiration for independence from Denmark. Yet, the majority agrees that the transition towards full independence from Denmark must not jeopardise Greenland’s economic stability and its welfare system. Politically, the government of Greenland has communicated its preference to retain the existing self-government arrangement within the Kingdom of Denmark, through which it is associated with the EU as an Overseas Country and Territory and is covered by the NATO’s collective security guarantees. Whether Greenland would choose to seek full independence from Denmark in the future and reassess its relationship with the EU and NATO, while pursuing closer ties with the U.S., are important questions that remain outside the scope of this blog.

As matters stand, the crisis surrounding Greenland serves as a litmus test for international law and its ability to withstand pressure from great powers seeking regional dominance in the Arctic at the expense of its fundamental principles. Smaller states, such as Denmark, unable to match the military might of great powers, place their faith in alliances and international law. Seven NATO Member States – Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom –  issued a joint statement, expressing their solidarity with Denmark and the people of Greenland, and underscoring the importance of respect for the fundamental principles of international law. Recognising that NATO’s very survival was at stake, the EU threatened serious economic retaliatory measures over Greenland if the United States refused to pedal back its claims. It appears that tensions over Greenland have, at least temporarily, subsided following the Davos gathering. This might allow NATO and the EU to focus on containing threats emanating from the east rather than becoming further embroiled in internal divisions over Greenland. Although international law’s authority is under increasing strain, it should not be discarded. International law is an instrument capable of applying pressure, diffusing tensions, and promoting accountability. Ultimately, it remains an important tool available to smaller states to pressure great powers into compliance, and a yardstick against which the conduct of states is measured. In precarious times, when raw power threatens international law, we must not lower our guard. As UN Secretary-General António Guterres has warned, ‘the power of the law’ must never be replaced by the ‘law of the powerful’.

Dr Iryna Marchuk is an Associate Professor of International and Criminal Law at the Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. She is also the Principal Investigator of the EASTERNISATION project, which examines power shifts and the regionalisation of international law, supported by the Danish Independent Research Fund.