The July Revolution: Quota, Discrimination and Equality in International Law

Quota System in Bangladesh and Its Impact on the July Revolution

On 5 June 2024, the High Court of Bangladesh reinstated a quota system, overturning a 2018 decision, reserving 30% of all public sector jobs for the children and grandchildren of the freedom fighters of the 1971 Bangladesh liberation. This decision resulted in 56% of government jobs reserved under various quota categories. However, a government report from 2024 reflected that around 40% of Bangladesh's 15-24-year-old population were not in education, employment or training (NEET). Struggling to find employment in the private sector and access public jobs, the students perceived such an extensive quota system as discriminatory and started a nationwide protest.

The student-led movement quickly received widespread public backing, drawing in thousands of Bangladeshis, including women, children and adults from diverse socioeconomic, professional and religious backgrounds, who felt the same 'deeper grievances about…..denial of economic, social and cultural human rights.' In response to this quota-reform turned cross-society demonstration, the former government deployed forces to suppress the protestors. The Supreme Court of Bangladesh soon overturned the earlier High Court Division by limiting the quota to 7%. However, it was too late, as the initial attempts of the government to end the demonstration transformed into lethal and militarised uses of force. Serious human rights violations followed in the next couple of weeks. 'Increased authoritarianism and a growing democracy deficit' drove the uprising, eventually resulting in the fall of the 15-year-long authoritarian regime.

This student outcry was not a spontaneous revolt, but a direct reaction to the June 2024 Court order reinstating the freedom-fighter quota that reserved more than half of the public jobs. Legislated as a tribute to 1971 veterans, the scheme collided with youth expectations of merit-based access to scarce public jobs, transforming a legal tweak into a nationwide demand for economic and social rights.

Significance of the Quota System

The significance of the quota system lies in social inclusion, which is closely connected with the objective of international human rights as recognised by the Bill of Rights. The most common practice of quotas is seen in education, employment, or political participation, generally applied to disadvantaged groups based on gender, minority, and disabilities–an approach beyond formal equality. Hence, quota is intimately linked with equality. Nevertheless, the question remains who should be subject to the equality laws since arbitrary quota rules can lead to strong reactions, as witnessed during the July Revolution. While civil and political rights violations during the July Revolution became the centre of attention in the post-July discussion, the issue of quota allocation and discrimination, from where everything started, received significantly less importance. Accordingly, analysing quota allocation through international human-rights law is indispensable for grasping the construction and contestation of equality vis-à-vis (positive) discrimination simultaneously from a 'multi-level perspective'–at the international, regional and domestic levels.

International Law Framework of Equality and Affirmative Action/Positive Discrimination

The principle of equality is the cornerstone of international human rights law, first enshrined in the United Nations Charter to promote human rights 'without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.' Equal protection without discrimination has also been guaranteed in Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In addition, Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) extends non-discrimination to economic rights, including employment. A clearer understanding of the equality framework can be drawn from the view of the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) in Broeks v Netherlands–the different treatment of people in like situations gives rise to discrimination unless it rests on 'reasonable and objective criteria', but the different treatment of people in different situations does not necessarily breach Article 26 of the ICCPR.

Although there is no widely accepted legal definition, affirmative action or positive discrimination refers to state initiatives that are generally designed to benefit members of disadvantaged groups. In other words, it is a special measure that requires States to 'diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination.' Article 26 of the ICCPR and Article 2(2) of ICESCR, while guaranteeing equality, also permit temporary special measures. Substantive equality permits differential treatment to rectify historical disadvantages, but only if proportionate and temporary, as upheld in Article 4(1) of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and Article 1(4) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). The HRC recognised equality as substantive in General Comment No. 18, requiring states to address structural inequalities beyond formal equal treatment. Nevertheless, it also emphasises that such measures must be necessary, proportionate, and time-bound to the extent of achieving the objective, to avoid entrenching new inequalities.

Under the Basic Principles on Remedy and Reparation (UN GA Res 60/147), compensatory measures are legitimate only where they are necessary and proportionate to the harm sustained. Bangladesh's 30% 'freedom-fighter-descendant' quota, therefore, had to pass a proportionality test. The HRC confirmed in Althammer v Austria that any employment-related preference must (i) pursue a legitimate aim and (ii) remain proportionate to that aim. Extending the quota to grandchildren of veterans, however, confers a lifelong advantage that begins in university admissions and continues into public-sector careers, far beyond any direct redress for 1971-era harms, causing systematic advantages from the earliest stages of life. Because many beneficiaries are not socio-economically disadvantaged, the measure conflicts with Articles 28(4) and 29(3)(a) of the Constitution, which reserve preferences for truly 'backward' sections of citizens, since 'creation of super privileged class for descendants of freedom fighters is beyond the constitutional scope and, a denial of equality and non-discrimination.' This raises questions about whether such extensive benefits remain proportionate or justified under international equality standards.

It is important to note that, in the view of the HRC, Article 26 of ICCPR does not merely duplicate the rights guaranteed in Article 2 of ICCPR; instead, it is an autonomous right to guarantee de jure equality through the guarantee of equal protection of law. There is also a concept of de facto equality upheld in Thlimmenos v Greece, which states that '[t]‌he right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is also violated when States without an objective and reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different.' Taken together, these authorities suggest that positive-action tools–such as quotas–can be permissible, but only when they pursue a legitimate aim and are proportionate to that aim; whether a specific quota meets that test is therefore a context-sensitive, case-by-case inquiry.

Reasonableness and Objective Criteria

Non-discrimination under Article 26 of the ICCPR and Article 2(2) of the ICESCR requires that any differential treatment be based on 'reasonable and objective' criteria. Early HRC views in Broeks affirmed this standard–'differentiation based on reasonable and objective criteria does not amount to prohibited discrimination.' Similarly, ILO Convention No. 111, which Bangladesh has ratified, prohibits discrimination in employment and occupation unless such distinctions are objectively justified.

The 30% 'freedom-fighter-descendant' quota was initially justified as a means of patriotic tribute to the country's war heroes. Under General Comment 18, however, any preferential measure must also be necessary, objective and proportionate to its aim. In 2024, that quota sat inside a reservation scheme that ring-fenced 56% of civil-service posts, and its reinstatement ignited widespread protests that left scores dead and the administration in crisis–evidence that the policy deepened, rather than eased, social exclusion. Freedom fighters' descendants are now in the third generation, and their predecessors (the second generation) have already been entitled to the preferential treatment, questioning whether they are still subject to the similar level of economic hardship during the early post-1971 period. Meanwhile, reserving 56% of jobs, when 40% of youth were NEET, excluded qualified candidates absenting evidence of proportional need, which may fail to meet Broeks' standard. Hence, Bangladesh's 30% quota lacked reasonable criteria in 2024 since the freedom fighters' descendants, unlike marginalised groups, were not found to be faced with documented systemic barriers of contemporary social or economic relevance.

Global Practice

Affirmative action is common but varied and scrutinised, highlighting the need for balanced action. For example, in the United States, the Supreme Court's decisions in Students for Fair Admissions v Harvard and Students for Fair Admissions v UNC struck down race-conscious college-admission policies as 'wrongful discrimination' under the Equal Protection Clause, largely limiting federal permission of racial quotas. Also, some national laws suggest that affirmative action policies should suffice certain foregoing requirements. South Africa's Employment Equity Act reserves jobs for historically disadvantaged groups (e.g. Black South Africans), justified by apartheid's legacy, but the South African Constitutional Court upheld the requirement of proportionality in Solidarity v Department of Correctional Services. Similarly, in D.H. and Others v Czech Republic, the European Court of Human Rights permitted Roma education quotas but stressed objective justification and proportionality. Furthermore, affirmative action policies can evolve in accordance with societal developments. For example, the Supreme Court of India in Indra Sawhney v Union of India upheld caste-based reservations yet imposed a 50% ceiling on total quotas; three decades later Janhit Abhiyaan v Union of India upheld a new 10% 'economically weaker sections' quota, treating it as an exceptional departure from but not an overruling of the previous cap.

In the case of Bangladesh, the Supreme Court's 7% cap plausibly aligns with Althammer's proportionality requirement. However, the government's prolonged inaction in reforming the quota system fuelled international human rights violations. Additionally, reports of fraudulent listings of 'fake freedom fighters' and a sharp increase in such numbers during the former regime raised serious concerns. These issues suggested that the quota system was increasingly serving the interests of politically influential groups rather than genuinely marginalised communities, thereby undermining its original justification.

Conclusion

Affirmative preference is one of the most controversial forms of affirmative action because it may treat individuals as members of groups or categories without regard to individual merit. However, the social inclusion of disadvantaged groups is always of significant importance. Thus, the fairness of quotas largely depends on the identification, assessment and interpretation of what a 'disadvantaged' group is, to what extent they are disadvantaged and for how long they are disadvantaged. In this process, transparency is indispensable for fact-finding and making informed decisions.

To address quota allocation issues like those in Bangladesh, a wise approach could be to implement a periodic review that assists in timely and fairly safeguarding equality. In addition, applying international law principles like reasonableness, objectivity, temporality, and proportionality is crucial for keeping a fair order within a country. By embedding substantive equality, Bangladesh can honour its Liberation War legacy while ensuring economic inclusion, averting future unrest and upholding the July Revolution's call for justice.