The July Revolution: Internet Shutdown and Media Restrictions to Curtail Freedom of Expression

Date Published: July 9, 2025

Editor's Note: This is the third post of the CILJ Symposium on 'Human Rights in Crisis: The July Revolution in Bangladesh.'

During the July Revolution, the former Government of Bangladesh implemented unannounced internet shutdowns without justification or due process, which arguably breached international human rights law and failed to meet domestic constitutional threshold. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) fact-finding report found a nexus between the government's decision to use force and lethal weapons with the shutdown of the internet. The massacres were committed by the State forces, mostly during the internet shutdown. The lack of social media access and the absolute State control of media hindered the real facts pertinent to the violations of human rights, the availability of which heavily relies on the internet. Despite the former government's effort to impose internet shutdowns and limit journalists' access to information, the student-led uprising in Bangladesh eventually overthrew the regime.

Internet shutdowns and media restrictions were, inter alia, major repercussion tactics that severely undermined citizens' ability to exercise their right to freedom of expression. Freedom of expression, safeguarded under international law through instruments like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), is essential for fostering democracy, empowering individuals, enabling access to information, and upholding the right to dissent.

In this article, 'freedom of expression' refers to the right protected by ICCPR and UDHR; this right covers the individual's 'freedom of speech' (oral or written opinion), the institutional 'freedom of the press' (editorial autonomy), and, as a practical matter, the 'right to the internet' is treated as the digital conduit through which these rights are exercised.

Freedom of Expression under International and National Law

Article 19 of the ICCPR grants everyone the right to hold opinions and establishes a broad and inclusive right to freedom of expression, affirming that everyone is entitled to exercise this freedom, with some exceptions on the grounds such as national security and public order provided in Article 19(3). In General Comment No. 34, the tripartite test mandates that such restrictions on freedom of expression must satisfy three rigorous criteria. It must be enshrined in law, pursue a legitimate aim such as protecting public safety or others' rights, and be both necessary and proportionate to achieve that aim without unduly limiting the right. In addition, the UDHR guarantees freedom of speech in the preamble and freedom of opinion and expression of individuals in Article 19. The freedom of expression outlined in Article 19 of the ICCPR closely aligns with the principles established in the UDHR.

In May 2022, a UNHRC report found that Bangladesh, among several Asian countries, used internet shutdowns as a tool for suppressing dissent and controlling information. The prescription of addressing security concerns on the internet articulated in the UN General Assembly's declaration on the promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the internet has not been reflected in the domestic laws of Bangladesh. In the absence of directly acknowledging the right to the internet as a human right, the incorporation of freedom of expression in the Constitution encompasses its obligation towards citizens both offline and online.

The Constitution of Bangladesh, under Article 39, ensures every citizen's right to freedom of speech and expression; and the freedom of the press. Additionally, the Press Council Act 1974 nominally provides further safeguard for press freedom. However, during the July Revolution, the regime flagrantly violated citizens' basic rights under the pretext of national security and public interest, including the constitutional rights, which are deemed fundamental and supreme in accordance with Articles 7(2) and 26(2) of the Constitution. The government invoked Section 97 of the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulation Act (2001), and Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (1898) to justify the internet shutdown, which has plainly been rejected by lawyers, experts and human rights activists.

The UN Human Rights Committee has emphasised that freedom of expression is crucial to the foundation of any democratic society. In 2012, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) adopted a resolution affirming that the rights individuals enjoy offline must equally be safeguarded online, particularly concerning freedom of expression. Moreover, in a 2016 Resolution, the UNHRC denounced any actions obstructing internet access, recognising them as infringements on human rights.

The Human Rights Committee also emphasised the need for measures to prevent excessive media control that could obstruct freedom of expression in Philip Afuson Njaru v Cameroon and Mavlonov and Sa'di v Uzbekistan, affirming its application to journalistic freedom and addressing state efforts to control media spaces. Further, in Essono Mika Miha v Equatorial Guinea, the Committee highlights the strong protection of political expression under Article 19. In General Comment No. 10, the Committee reaffirmed the necessity to protect mass media from excessive state control, as it threatens the right to freedom of expression. The exercise of freedom of speech and expression are interlinked with the freedom of the press. Access to the internet and unrestricted use of such is fundamental to the enjoyment of the rights mentioned above.

Internet Shutdown in Bangladesh Violated Freedom of Expression

As a State party to the ICCPR, Bangladesh was obligated to ensure freedom of expression and access to information to fulfil its obligation under international law during the July Revolution. However, during the internet shutdown, six journalists lost their lives and over 200 were injured during protests, as arbitrary shutdowns stifled social media organisation, concealed evidence of state violence, and hampered protest coordination. Moreover, they enabled the tracking and arrests of activists, intensifying the suppression of dissent. The shutdown of the internet gave advantage to the law enforcement and intelligence services to raid residential areas to target students, and such conduct remained mostly unpublished and undocumented.

The internet shutdown began by restricting WhatsApp messaging at Dhaka University and a few more universities, followed by expansion to Facebook and YouTube, and quickly spread across 59 university campuses. This culminated in a nationwide suspension of mobile and broadband services following directives from the National Telecommunication Monitoring Centre (NTMC) to internet service providers and gateway operators. According to the OHCHR, these actions were taken without legal basis or due process, and coincided with escalations in security-force violence (paras 192–194, 198–199).

Concurrently, the OHCHR also found that journalists were subject to direct threats and physical attacks when reporting on protests. Security forces and pro-government actors used rubber bullets, pellets, and physical beatings to obstruct press coverage in areas like Jatrabari, Paltan, and Jahangirnagar University, leading to fatal injuries and deterring further reporting (paras 184–187). Officials also exerted a climate of intimidation on media owners to suppress dissenting narratives and used arrests and surveillance to silence critical voices (para 190).

Simultaneously, the blackout created an information vacuum that allowed state-controlled outlets to immediately fill with unverified or outright false narratives about the protests. Independent fact-checkers and civil-society groups were silenced, allowing government propaganda to go unchecked and fuelling confusion about the scale and nature of the unrest. The right to 'seek, receive and impart information' is a core element of substantive freedom of expression, which was violated by the shutdown and ensuing media clampdown through suppression of countering dissemination of misinformation.

The justification for the internet shutdown and media restriction was rooted not in genuine national security concerns, but in protecting the regime's own political agenda, which was arguably driven by unjust self-interest, since the OHCHR documented the shutdown was ordered solely to shield the Government's escalating use of lethal force from public scrutiny (paras 196-199). It contravened the standards of Article 19(3) of the ICCPR and failed to meet its criteria for exceptions, thereby violating the right to freedom of expression. Therefore, the State did not comply with this standard.

Global Practice

Internet blackouts have emerged as a pressing global issue, with over 125 shutdowns recorded in the last 12 months. Authoritarian regimes often enforce internet shutdowns to suppress freedom of expression, assembly, and access to information. Similarly, in Bangladesh, the government imposed a nationwide internet shutdown to curb quota reform protests, lasting for over 150 hours and affecting the rights of 170 million citizens. This act of digital suppression infringed upon citizens' fundamental rights and established a dangerous precedent for authoritarian control in the digital age.

Regional courts recognise that although States enjoy a degree of discretion in restricting the freedom of expression, e.g., the ECtHR's establishment of margin of appreciation doctrine in Handyside v United Kingdom, any measures must still satisfy the test of necessity and proportionality. In Fatullayev v Azerbaijan, the ECtHR held that imprisoning a journalist for government criticism–an analogue to Bangladesh's July 2024 media clampdown–violated Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Likewise, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Kimel v Argentinaand Herrera Ulloa v Costa Rica identified punitive actions against journalists as violations of freedom of expression. Furthermore, the Economic Community of West African States Court in Access Now v Togo explicitly denounced excessive and unlawful internet shutdowns as disproportionate restrictions. Bangladesh's five-day blackout and coordinated media suppression, which was unlawful and politically motivated, clearly failed to meet the necessity and proportionality standard from the comparative perspective.

Digital Rights in Bangladesh after July 2024

Since 2018, Bangladesh has frequently restricted access to social media platforms and messaging applications while slowing internet connectivity, often without justification from the government or telecommunications providers. A notable instance includes the nationwide mobile internet throttling during the 2018 road safety protests. Similar disruptions repeatedly occurred during protests and opposition gatherings from 2019 to 2023, reflecting a pattern of digital suppression aimed at controlling dissent and public discourse.

After July 2024, Starlink got approval from the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) to operate in the country. Tech companies' compliance, paired with restrictive rules targeting innovative services like Starlink, underscores the conflict between technological progress and government control. To protect digital rights, telecom firms should promote transparency, while regulations must prioritise user privacy and ensure independent operations to prevent future disruptions.

Conclusion

The international obligation of Bangladesh cannot be eschewed under the camouflage of domestic laws' preference. The right to the internet is a key right in the contemporary world for facilitating the exercise of the freedom of expression and the press. The shutdown of the internet resulted in the infringement of the related rights. In the new Bangladesh, the right to the internet should be guaranteed, and domestic parameters of restrictions on enjoying freedom of expression and the press should be revised in light of international instruments, particularly the benchmarks set by international human rights law.

Md Mostafa Hosain is an Assistant Professor of Law at BRAC University, Dhaka, Bangladesh, and a PhD fellow at the University of Malaya, Malaysia. He holds an MPhil in Legal Studies and an LL.M. with Distinction from South Asian University, India. He has a PGD in International Law and Diplomacy from the Indian Academy of International Law. He completed his LL.B. from the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh.