Editor's Note: This is the fifth post of the CILJ Symposium on 'Human Rights in Crisis: The July Revolution in Bangladesh.

Between 1 July and 5 August 2024, Bangladesh went through a human rights crisis period, including significant obstacles to access to justice. The July Revolution started with a High Court order in Ohidul Islam and Others v The Government of Bangladesh and Others to reinstate the public service employment quota to 56%, which was eventually limited by the Supreme Court to 7%. However, the student-led anti-discrimination quota protest escalated into a nationwide uprising in the meantime due to a violent crackdown to suppress protesting students. According to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) fact-finding Report, 'neither prosecutorial authorities nor the judiciary took any meaningful action to curb acts and practices of arbitrary detention and torture, or to ensure that any officials perpetrating such acts were held accountable.' The report further documented that no bail application was allowed due to the administration's intervention, which further curtailed access to justice. Access to justice has also been denied by other prolonged factors, such as the case backlog and shortage of judges, and contemporary issues like not presenting arrested individuals before the court (para 71) within due time. Thus, the administration plays a significant role in denying the right to access to justice.

Legal Foundations for Access to Justice and Judicial Independence

The right to a fair trial is at the heart of human rights, and is necessary for access to justice–a fundamental principle of international human rights law. Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that 'anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court.' In addition, Article 14 of the ICCPR establishes the universal right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal, whereby it is a non-derogable right. Article 14 requires 'securing access to justice and the delivery of minimum standards of justice'. Bangladesh ratified ICCPR in 2000 without any reservations. Moreover, the first and second principles of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary emphasise, respectively, that the judiciary must be free from political influence and that judges must act impartially, without any form of external interference. The European Court of Human Rights, in Findlay v The United Kingdom, highlighted the importance of judicial independence by ruling that a tribunal lacking independence and impartiality violated the right to a fair trial.

The Constitution of Bangladesh lays down further fundamental safeguards for the judicial system. Article 22 mandates separation of the judiciary from the executive, Article 27 guarantees equality before the law, Article 31 protects against arbitrary deprivation of life and liberty, and Article 35 ensures a speedy, public trial by an impartial tribunal and protection from torture and inhumane treatment. While Article 22 is placed within Part II of the Constitution–Fundamental Principles of State Policy ('Fundamental Principles'), the rest of the Articles are fundamental rights (Part III) of every Bangladeshi citizen. The difference between these two parts has been clarified in Article 8(2) as the Fundamental Principles 'shall not be judicially enforceable.' However, the landmark decision in Masdar Hossain v Bangladesh affirmed judicial independence, requiring executive non-interference. Section 24 of the Evidence Act (1872) further safeguards this right by making confessions obtained through coercion, threat, or inducement inadmissible in court, thereby strengthening the justice system. Additionally, the Torture and Custodial Death (Prohibition) Act (2013) gave effect to Bangladesh's obligations under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) by criminalising torture and custodial deaths and demanding prompt investigation, trial and victim compensation. These laws strengthen access to justice and judicial independence by mandating impartial investigations, time-bound trials and legal remedies against abuse by state actors. However, these measures largely remain ineffective.

Fairness on Trial: The Struggle for Justice Amid the July Revolution

During the July Revolution, this executive prohibition on the judiciary reached its peak. Thousands of people were arbitrarily arrested (para 71) for participating in the protests. Although Article 33 of the Constitution requires that any person arrested or detained must be brought before the nearest magistrate within twenty-four hours of the arrest, the OHCHR report found that many arrested protestors were not presented before the Court within the given time. In fact, 'none of the victims of arbitrary arrest interviewed by OHCHR were informed about charges without delay or were served an arrest warrant (para 159),' and 'only a minority were brought before a judge within 24 hours (para 159).' For example, one of the student leaders of the protest, Arif Sohail, was detained, but 'his whereabouts remained unknown for nearly 36 hours.' Similarly, Amnesty International documented the taking of the six student coordinators into custody, which was later phrased as for their 'safety.' Nevertheless, they were forced to declare an end to the movement. These coercive actions by the executive severely affected people's right to a fair trial.

False charges were another element of restricting a fair trial. In Dhaka, there were 200,000 unnamed people accusedduring the protest. This leaves room for the law enforcement agencies to put anyone's name as they wish, especially framing politically motivated cases–a common practice that has long kept the judiciary under the shadow of the executive. The OHCHR report found that not a single judge rejected remand requests for detainees, even though many of these applications were based on mass cases naming dozens of individuals, both identified and unidentified, without credible evidence linking them to any criminal activity (para 159). In addition, the participants arrested by law enforcement and taken to court was denied bail and jailed. Even a 17-year-old boy was remanded during this 'no bail' directive by the executives. By contrast, nearly 5,000 individuals were granted bail by judges and magistrates in the subordinate judiciary following the downfall of the previous government, signalling a sudden and welcome assertion of judicial independence in the absence of executive intervention.

Judiciary-Executive Dynamics and the Struggle for Judicial Independence

The July Revolution did not lead to Bangladesh's rule-of-law crisis; it exposed how decades of executive encroachment had hollowed out the courts just when society most urgently needed them. While the Constitution of Bangladesh ostensibly provides a robust framework for the separation of powers, the practical reality is far more compromised. The judiciary, far from being an independent branch, has historically faced systemic encroachment by the executive–an issue that long persists before the July Revolution but became particularly pronounced during and after it.

One of the most striking manifestations of executive dominance was the enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment (2014), which empowered the Parliament to remove Supreme Court judges. Although this amendment was later declared unconstitutional in Government of Bangladesh and others v Advocate Asaduzzaman Siddiqui and others, the very attempt to legislate such a sweeping power shift demonstrated a risk of eroding judicial independence. Beyond this, judicial appointments to the higher courts have long been determined by the executive, creating a culture of dependency and political loyalty. The processes of recruitment, promotion, transfer, and sanction of judges also remain heavily influenced by the executive, undermining any claims of impartiality or institutional autonomy. Therefore, the threat of 'informal removal', such as withholding promotions, transfers and housing, persisted, which consequently compelled the rubber-stamping of thousands of unnamed cases.

Under Article 95 of the Constitution, Supreme Court judges 'shall be appointed by the President,' but Article 48(3)requires the President to act on the advice of the Prime Minister. In effect, judicial appointments remain executive-controlled. During the quota protest, the Law Ministry relied on this dependency, instructing officials (para 159) to deny bail and allow police remand. These July-specific facts reflect the underlying risk that when the same organ that commands the police also controls the judiciary, courts may convert constitutional rights into discretionary privileges. The true crisis, therefore, is structural rather than episodic, and any sustainable solution must tackle appointments, discipline and financing in one package.

These erosions of checks and balances are acutely reflected in the disruption of the constitutional equilibrium among the three branches of government. When the executive branch assumes the roles preserved for other branches, the very fabric of democratic governance begins to fray, and judicial independence is disrupted. According to the Global State of Democracy 2023 report, Bangladesh ranked 134th for 'rights' and 135th for 'rule of law'. These metrics reflect not just theoretical concerns, but the lived experiences of citizens increasingly excluded from legal protections.

Bangladesh's judiciary has been strategically co-opted under successive regimes, particularly during the tenure of the former government. As detailed by the International Human Rights Commission, one tactic involved populating senior judicial and quasi-judicial roles with individuals loyal to the ruling regime, thereby entrenching cronyism at the expense of merit and competence. Such a manipulated judiciary not only diminishes public confidence in the judiciary but also weakens the overall legitimacy of democratic institutions.

The result is that the judiciary was perceived not as an independent guarantor of justice but as an arm of the ruling government. Public frustration with these failures contributed to the groundswell of resistance that culminated in the July Revolution. Many viewed the denial of legal remedies and politicised judicial decisions as symptoms of a broader authoritarian shift. In light of this, the July Revolution was not simply a political upheaval. Rather, it was a demand for institutional integrity and genuine rule of law.

Post-July Judicial Reforms: Foundations for Democratic Renewal in Bangladesh

To rebuild a functioning democracy in Bangladesh, justice for past abuses must be central to national reconciliation and institutional reform. The July Revolution, which saw mass protests against authoritarian practices and the erosion of democratic institutions, exposed the judiciary's limited capacity to serve as an effective check on executive power. In response, the Interim Government has constituted a Judicial Reform Commission to examine and address the structural and functional deficits within the judicial system. However, for these efforts to be credible and transformative, judicial reforms must go beyond cosmetic changes.

In line with this, the Interim Government has already introduced the Supreme Judicial Appointment Ordinance (2025), establishing an independent council responsible for appointing judges to the Supreme Court. It is argued that the function of the council should extend to the discipline of the judges. Moreover, reforms should ensure appointment of judges in the subordinate judiciary based on meritocracy, strengthen access to justice through modernised court management, reduce case backlogs by introducing alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, and expand legal aid services, particularly for marginalised populations. Furthermore, in order to be fully independent for delivering justice, the financial autonomy of the judiciary (currently controlled by the executives) is also necessary.

Ultimately, judicial independence is not merely a legal or institutional ideal–it is foundational for protecting human rights, resolving political conflicts peacefully, and upholding the rule of law in times of crisis. Without a genuinely independent judiciary, the prospects for democratic consolidation in Bangladesh will remain fragile.

Dr Masrur Salekin is a Hardiman Research Scholar and holds a PhD in Collaborative Constitutionalism, Judicial Pro-Activism and Environmental Justice from the University of Galway, Ireland. He is also a Chevening Scholar and completed an LL.M in International Law and Development from the University of Nottingham, UK.