
Authors: Arkaneil Bhaumik and Siddharth Jain
Date Posted: 1 April 2022

This article argues that the COVID-19 pandemic exposed major weaknesses in global public health governance and demonstrated the need for a new international pandemic treaty.
The authors focus on the limitations of the World Health Organization and the existing International Health Regulations framework, claiming that current rules lack adequate enforcement power and failed during recent health emergencies.
They propose a stronger treaty built around three core reforms.
The article defines global governance as the institutions, norms, and procedures through which states cooperate to address transnational problems.
According to the authors, pandemics are a clear example of a challenge no state can solve alone because infectious diseases cross borders rapidly.
They argue that failures were visible not only during COVID-19, but also during:
Thus, they see a new treaty as an urgent necessity.
The authors argue that early warning is the most effective way to prevent outbreaks from becoming global pandemics.
They propose that states should be legally required to notify the WHO within 24 hours after learning of an event that may constitute a pandemic threat.
Even short delays in reporting outbreaks can allow disease to spread internationally.
The article criticizes instances where governments allegedly withheld or delayed information during outbreaks, citing China during:
SARS
early COVID-19
The authors say a treaty should empower the WHO to ensure compliance, potentially including:
diplomatic consequences
economic sanctions
authority to investigate unofficial reports
They also suggest WHO should be able to verify credible information appearing on social media.
The article argues that many states imposed excessive border closures and travel bans during pandemics despite WHO guidance questioning their effectiveness.
Under the IHR, states were supposed to justify such measures and notify the WHO, but the authors say many ignored these obligations.
A new treaty should make WHO recommendations on travel restrictions binding during pandemics.
If a state disagrees, there should be:
mandatory consultation with WHO
scientific evidence sharing
dispute resolution mechanisms
The authors propose a compromissory clause giving the International Court of Justice jurisdiction over disputes involving unnecessary travel restrictions and economic losses caused by them.
They note that travel bans can severely harm economies, especially tourism-dependent states.
The article recommends creating a permanent institutional body similar to treaty conferences used in environmental and anti-corruption law.
This would be a Conference of Parties (COP) for the pandemic treaty.
It would:
monitor implementation
review national preparedness
assess compliance
coordinate future reforms
The authors suggest a review model where:
each state submits self-assessments
two other states evaluate compliance
reports identify strengths and failures
false declarations may trigger penalties
They compare this to the treaty review system under the United Nations Convention against Corruption.
The authors acknowledge critics may argue these proposals interfere with state sovereignty.
However, they contend that pandemics and climate change require stronger international institutions because purely national responses are insufficient.
Their position is that unrestricted sovereignty during pandemics can worsen collective harm.
The article also broadens the discussion to healthcare capacity, arguing that global preparedness should include:
accessible medical systems
emergency treatment capacity
stronger health infrastructure
Bhaumik and Jain conclude that COVID-19 showed the danger of a “me first” approach by states.
They argue that a future pandemic treaty should move beyond weak coordination and establish enforceable global rules.
Their three central pillars are:
rapid mandatory outbreak reporting
binding rules on travel restrictions
a permanent compliance and review conference
Overall, the article frames pandemics as a governance challenge requiring stronger international legal institutions rather than voluntary cooperation alone.
The authors are identified as final-year law students at National Law University Odisha.

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Cambridge International Law Journal
Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge
10 West Road
Cambridge CB3 9DZ
United Kingdom

General Enquiries: editors@cilj.co.uk
Blog Enquiries: blog@cilj.co.uk
Conference: conference@cilj.co.uk