Symposium on Bangladesh Genocide and International Law: The Politics of International Law in the Context of Bangladesh Genocide

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The following interview was conducted virtually by Emraan Azad on 9 May 2022 with Mohammad Shahabuddin, Professor and Chair in International Law & Human Rights at University of Birmingham. His work focuses on the history and theory of international law, minority rights, postcolonialism, and Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL).

What were the colonial experiences that led to the crisis of 1971 in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)?

MS: One way of understanding the colonial dimensions of the 1971 crisis is through the concept of internal colonialism, a phenomenon often overlooked in mainstream colonial discourse.

Before the partition of 1947, the peoples of the Indian subcontinent had lived under British Empire rule. Partition itself was deeply shaped by colonial governance. The creation of India and Pakistan along religious lines reflected colonial ideas about nationhood and identity. It was an unrealistic arrangement geographically, yet many elites in East Bengal initially supported it.

The religious basis that held Pakistan together quickly weakened. What had begun as a division between Muslims and Hindus soon transformed into ethnic hierarchy. West Pakistani elites increasingly treated East Bengal as an appendage of the state, producing discriminatory relations with the Bengali majority.

Statistical evidence from the 1950s and 1960s shows this imbalance. Senior military and civil service posts overwhelmingly went to West Pakistanis. Public spending on defence, education, and industrial investment was also heavily concentrated in the western wing.

This amounted to internal colonialism. East Pakistan, despite having the larger population, was governed and economically marginalised by political and military elites in West Pakistan.

When Bengalis resisted this inequality, especially after the democratic mandate of 1970, the military crackdown beginning in March 1971 reproduced those colonial relations through mass violence. The atrocities against Bengalis amount to genocide, though international recognition of that fact remains limited.

Did the Pakistan government commit an act of aggression against the people of Bangladesh?

MS: Yes. The Bengali population was demanding an end to structural discrimination in employment, investment, language policy, and political representation. Their demands were legitimate.

The military response by Pakistan was therefore an act of aggression against its own people.

At the same time, Pakistan framed events differently. It relied on the principle of territorial integrity, one of the core doctrines of international law. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto argued before the United Nations Security Council on 15 December 1971 that the UN was “legalising aggression,” referring to India’s intervention.

From Bangladesh’s perspective, however, independence had already been declared on 26 March 1971 after the genocidal events of 25 March. An interim government was formed in April, and an international campaign for recognition followed.

Thus, what Pakistan called defence of sovereignty was viewed in Bangladesh as unlawful aggression and systematic violation of human rights.

How do you respond to the statement that the Bangladesh crisis in 1971 was a matter of Pakistan’s internal affairs?

MS: Territorial integrity is indeed a foundational principle of international law. But so too are human rights.

It is mistaken to imagine that the post-1945 international order is based solely on sovereignty and non-intervention. The creation of the United Nations after the Second World War reflected a compromise between sovereignty and the imperative to prevent atrocities such as the Holocaust.

The argument that a state may do whatever it wishes within its borders has no place in that legal architecture when gross human rights abuses or genocide are involved.

Therefore, Pakistan’s claim that the repression in East Pakistan was purely an internal matter lacked legal legitimacy, even if enforcement mechanisms were weak.

Given the crisis of 1971, how do you evaluate the right to self-determination within the contest between territorial sovereignty and human rights?

MS: Self-determination is traditionally understood in two contexts: colonial peoples seeking independence, and peoples within existing states seeking internal autonomy.

In decolonisation contexts, the right belonged to the people of the colony as a whole. This principle was reinforced through doctrines such as uti possidetis, which preserved colonial borders.

Within existing states, however, the right is usually internal rather than external. It may involve federalism, autonomy, or power-sharing rather than secession.

The grey area is remedial secession. If a state persistently denies internal self-determination, commits mass atrocities, and threatens the existence of a people, secession may become the only remaining option.

After March 1971, Pakistan’s actions left East Pakistan with little realistic alternative other than independence. While remedial secession remains controversial in positive international law, it is strongly supported in human rights discourse.

Bangladesh’s case can therefore be understood through both remedial secession and anti-colonial analogies, given the ethnic concentration, geographical separation, and severe repression involved.

Did international law or international organisations immediately respond to the crisis of 1971?

MS: Not effectively.

Between March and December 1971, there was very little meaningful action at the UN despite ongoing atrocities. The crisis only received sustained attention in December, once war between India and Pakistan had formally broken out.

The United Nations Security Council was paralysed by Cold War divisions. The United States and China largely backed Pakistan, while the Soviet Union supported India.

Security Council Resolution 303 (1971) acknowledged that disagreement among permanent members prevented the Council from fulfilling its responsibility to maintain international peace and security.

The United Nations General Assembly focused primarily on humanitarian concerns, especially the refugee crisis in India, where nearly ten million Bengali refugees had fled.

The UN response therefore centred on relief and repatriation rather than confronting genocide or assigning responsibility.

Could international law have behaved differently in 1971?

MS: Not really. International law functioned as it often does: it provided arguments and tools, but their use depended on power and politics.

Pakistan and its allies invoked sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention. Bangladesh, India, global civil society, and scholars invoked self-determination, humanitarian intervention, dignity, and human rights.

Bangladesh ultimately emerged not because international law delivered liberation, but because of popular resistance, sacrifice, and political struggle. International law recognised the outcome afterward.

That is the enduring lesson of 1971: international law is deeply entangled with global power politics. It can be used in emancipatory ways, but it rarely operates independently of political realities.