Azerbaijan’s destruction of Armenian cultural heritage constitutes ‘racial discrimination’;

Azerbaijan’s actions prevent persons of Armenian national or ethnic origin from accessing and enjoying, without discrimination, their historic, cultural and religious heritage;

Articles 2 and 5(d)(vii) and 5(e)(vi) are therefore engaged;

Armenia has ‘plausible rights’ in these provisions insofar as they are ‘grounded in a possible interpretation of the Convention’;

Azerbaijan’s actions may entail irreparable prejudice to those rights;

There is urgency; and therefore

Provisional measures should be indicated in the terms sought.

The alleged desecration of Armenian cultural heritage sites by Azerbaijan gives rise to plausible rights under CERD;

It is established jurisprudence that cultural heritage sites can be subject to a serious risk of irreparable prejudice where such heritage has “been the scene of armed clashes between the parties” and “such clashes may reoccur”;

There is an urgency “in the sense that there is a real and imminent risk that such prejudice will be caused before the Court makes a final decision in the case.”

Accordingly, Azerbaijan must “take all necessary measures to prevent and punish acts of vandalism and desecration affecting Armenian cultural heritage, including but not limited to churches and other places of worship, monuments, landmarks, cemeteries and artefacts.”

CERD protects the basic rights and fundamental freedoms of human beings. Monuments, buildings, sites and artefacts plainly cannot be racially discriminated against.

The right to equal participation in cultural activities is not a stand-alone right. For the Article 5 to be engaged, the interference with the right to equal participation in cultural activities must be due to racial discrimination. The Order does not set out how Azerbaijan’s alleged actions amount to racial discrimination.

Religious discrimination is to be distinguished from racial discrimination. The protection of religious heritage from desecration is the province of international humanitarian law, not CERD.

The Court’s reliance on its previous jurisprudence in support of the proposition that there can be a risk of irreparable damage to cultural heritage is misplaced. In the Temple case, the Court enjoyed a much wider jurisdictional basis following the parties’ declarations recognising its compulsory jurisdiction, which naturally extended to an authority to consider the applicability of different cultural heritage protection instruments.