
Author: Fahrid Chishty
Date Posted: 24 March 2022

This article examines whether the destruction or desecration of cultural heritage can amount to racial discrimination under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, focusing on the provisional measures order issued by the International Court of Justice in the case between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The post presents competing legal arguments: one side supporting the ICJ’s intervention to protect Armenian heritage, and the other questioning whether CERD is the correct legal framework.
The dispute arose after renewed hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh.
Armenia alleged that Azerbaijan had damaged, erased, or desecrated Armenian churches, cemeteries, monuments, and other historic sites.
Armenia sought provisional measures from the ICJ requiring Azerbaijan to protect this heritage while the case proceeds.
According to the article, Armenia’s position can be summarized as follows:
Because the cultural sites are associated with persons of Armenian national or ethnic origin, their destruction may prevent Armenians from accessing and enjoying their heritage on equal terms.
Thus, the conduct may fall within CERD protections.
The article refers to:
Article 2 – obligation to eliminate racial discrimination
Article 5(d)(vii) – freedom-related protections
Article 5(e)(vi) – participation in cultural activities
Under this reasoning, destruction of Armenian heritage may interfere with equal enjoyment of cultural life.
At the provisional measures stage, the ICJ does not decide the merits. It only asks whether claimed rights are plausible.
The article notes the Court found Armenia had plausible rights under CERD based on a possible interpretation of the Convention.
Damage to heritage sites can be permanent.
The Court therefore ordered Azerbaijan to:
take all necessary measures to prevent and punish acts of vandalism and desecration affecting Armenian cultural heritage.
This included churches, monuments, cemeteries, landmarks, and artefacts.
The article then sets out objections to using CERD in this context.
CERD protects the rights of persons and groups, not objects.
Buildings, artefacts, and monuments themselves cannot be racially discriminated against.
Therefore, critics argue the legal connection is indirect.
The author argues that interference with cultural life only engages CERD if it occurs because of racial discrimination.
The ICJ order, in this view, did not sufficiently explain how the alleged desecration was racially discriminatory rather than politically or militarily motivated.
Many targeted sites were churches or places of worship.
The article argues that attacks on religious heritage may involve religious discrimination, which is conceptually distinct from racial discrimination.
If so, CERD may not be the appropriate treaty basis.
The protection of cultural and religious property during armed conflict is traditionally governed by:
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
customary international humanitarian law
law of armed conflict rules protecting civilian cultural objects
Thus, critics say humanitarian law may be more suitable than CERD.
The article questions the Court’s reference to the Temple of Preah Vihear case.
In that case, the ICJ had broader jurisdiction, allowing it to directly consider cultural heritage obligations.
By contrast, in Armenia v Azerbaijan, the Court’s jurisdiction was based specifically on CERD.
Therefore, critics argue the precedent may not neatly apply.
This dispute highlights a growing question in international law:
Can attacks on cultural heritage also be understood as attacks on the identity of a people?
If yes, destruction of monuments may implicate anti-discrimination law when linked to ethnic exclusion or erasure.
If no, such conduct should remain primarily governed by armed conflict law and heritage protection treaties.
Fahrid Chishty’s article captures an important tension in international law.
The ICJ appeared willing to interpret CERD broadly enough to protect endangered Armenian heritage where ethnic identity is closely tied to cultural sites.
But critics worry this stretches CERD beyond its intended scope and blurs distinctions between:
racial discrimination
religious discrimination
wartime cultural destruction
heritage protection law
The case therefore raises a major doctrinal question: when does destruction of culture become discrimination against a people?

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Cambridge International Law Journal
Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge
10 West Road
Cambridge CB3 9DZ
United Kingdom

General Enquiries: editors@cilj.co.uk
Blog Enquiries: blog@cilj.co.uk
Conference: conference@cilj.co.uk